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Voting on Independence and
National Issues: A Historical and
Comparative Study of Referendums
on Self-Determination and
Secession
Etude historique et comparative des référendums d'autodétermination et de
sécession
Matt Qvortrup
L’existence d'une nation est (pardonnez-moi cette
métaphore) un plébiscite de tous les jours, comme
l'existence de l'individu est une affirmation
perpétuelle de vie. Ernest Renan, Qu'est-ce qu'une
nation?: conférence faite en Sorbonne, le 11 mars 1882,
Sorbonne, Paris, p. 27
Lex est quod populus iubet atque constituit. Gaius,
Institutiones, I,3, AD 161
It is easy to get carried away with the Scottish referendum – at least if you live north of
the border  in the United Kingdom.  The event  that  has  been trumpeted as  the most
important decision in 300 years, the biggest grassroots campaign in history, and other
assorted hyperbole,  certainly took up a fair share of column-inches and broadcasting
time in 2014. 
But before we are being swept away in the maelstrom of claims and counter-claims by
respectively Better Together and Yes Scotland, it is perhaps helpful to consider that this was
not  the first,  let  alone the most  momentous independence referendum held to date.
Indeed there have been many other equally significant independence referendums. This
article is aimed at presenting a historical and comparative overview of these referendums
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since the beginning of the 19th century. It also seeks to address some of the claims made
regarding  independence  referendums  and  to  consider  some of  the  practical  issues
pertaining to holding referendums on independence. The issues to be addressed include
matters such as:
• When and why have these referendums taken place?
• When and why are they won?
• Do referendums exacerbate ethnic conflict?
• Should there be a special majority in an independence referendum?
• Does the wording of the question on the ballot influence the outcome?
• Should expats have the right to vote?
 
The earlier history of referendums on independence
It is a little-known fact that the first referendums on independence were held in the
Confederate  states  in  America  in  the  early  1860s.  At  this  stage  the  referendum was
already a deep-seated part of political life. The first referendum in America was held in
1788 in Massachusetts, when voters were consulted on whether they wanted to give up
their independence and join the newly minted United States. By the mid-1850s it had
become  commonplace  to  consult  the  citizens  in  major  issues  of  constitutional
importance. It was natural, therefore, that Texas, Virginia and Tennessee submitted the
decision to secede from the Union to the voters in 1860. What is perhaps interesting is
that the support for secession was not unanimous. In Tennessee, for example, 104,019
voted for secession while 47,238 voted against, and in Texas the figures were 34,794 for
and 11,235 against. (We do not have figures for Virginia). These were not endorsements of
epic proportions – and perhaps this should have caused the Confederate leaders to think
again. The less than unanimous support perhaps suggested the nuclear option favoured
by the confederate elites was not supported by the Dixie voters. 
After the American Civil War referendums on independence were almost forgotten. To be
sure,  there  were  debates  about  plebiscites  to  resolve  the  border  dispute  between
Denmark and Germany, but these came to naught. It took a full 45 years before the next
referendum on independence was held: in this case, a vote on whether Norway should
secede from Sweden (more than 99 percent supported the proposition) in 1905.  That
referendum was the brainchild of Norwegian Prime Minister Christian Michelsen, who
wrong-footed  the  Swedish  Unionist  elite  by  calling  a  surprise  referendum  after  the
Swedish king had refused to appoint a government that had a majority in the Stortinget
(the Norwegian legislature).
However, although the principle of self-determination of the people was much espoused
in the wake of the First World War, especially by US President Woodrow Wilson who had
campaigned for the use of more referendums in America while he was governor of New
Jersey, no referendums were held on independence for the newly established countries
(e.g. Czechoslovakia or Yugoslavia) or the secession of states from established ones (e.g.
Hungary and Finland).  To be sure there were several referendums on the drawing of
borders in Europe, e.g. in Schleswig and in Tyrol in 1920. But referendums on outright
independence were not held. It was very much the case that, as a contemporary scholar
put it,  “the rules  governing the intercourse of  states  [did]  neither demand nor recognize the
application of the plebiscite [referendum] in the determination of sovereignty”.1
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In the period between the two World Wars, only two referendums were held: one in 1933,
on whether Western Australia should secede from Australia, another in 1935, on whether
the Philippines should become independent from the United States.  In the former,  a
majority  voted  for  independence,  but  as  the  National  Party,  which campaigned  for
independence, lost the election held on the same day, nothing came of it.2 In the latter
case, a successful referendum was held on a new independence constitution after the
Philippine Congress had rejected the US Congress’s Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act,  which had
granted independence for the erstwhile overseas dependency. 
However, it was not after the Second World War that referendums began to be used when
areas seceded from their parent states. Of the 56 referendums on independence since
1860, 50 have been held after 1944. But the vast majority of these (39 in total) were held
after 1990. 
As shown in Table 1 there were only 13 independence referendums in the four decades
after the Second World War. 
Table 1 Secession Referendums 1944-1980
Parent Country Seceding Country Year Turnout% Yes%  
Denmark Iceland 1944 98 99  
China Mongolia 1945 98 64  
Denmark Faroe Islands 1946 50 64  
UK Newfoundland 1948 52 88  
France Cambodia 1955 100 -  
France Guinea 1958 97 95  
New Zealand Western Samoa 1961 86 77  
West Ind
Fed
Jamaica 1961 46 60  
France Algeria 1962 99 75  
Malaysia Singapore 1962 71 90  
UK Malta 1964 50 80  
USA Micronesia 1975 52 59  
Canada Quebec 1980 85 41  
Source: www.c2d.ch (accessed October 2, 2013).
One would perhaps  have suspected that  these  referendums would have pertained to
decolonisation; that the independence movements would have sought popular approval
of their newly gained or espoused freedom. This was not the case. The elites who fought
for and won independence were not, in most cases, willing to risk the political victories
gained in negotiations by submitting declarations of independence to an unpredictable
electorate.  Indeed,  the  only  colonies  to  submit  the  declarations  of  independence  to
referendum were Cambodia, Western Samoa and Guinea. In the first two cases, the votes
were held at the instigation of the parent states, who wanted to show that there was
popular support for abandoning the territories. 
Voting on Independence and National Issues: A Historical and Comparative Stud...
Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, XX-2 | 2015
3
The Guinean referendum was somewhat different. It was held on the same day as eleven
other  referendums  in  other  French  colonies,  on  whether  to  take  part  in  the  newly
established Communauté française, established by Charles de Gaulle. The Guineans, led by
the independence leader Ahmed Sékou Touré, defied Paris and overwhelmingly voted (95
percent)  to  become independent.  France retaliated by withdrawing all  aid.  However,
within two years Mali, Niger, Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), Côte d'Ivoire, Chad, The
Central  African Republic,  The Republic of  Congo and Gabon – all  territories that had
returned huge majorities for maintaining links with France in the referendum in 1958 –
became independent states. But none of the new states submitted the decision to become
independent  to  the  voters.  It  was  almost  as  if  referendums  on  independence  were
anathema to the independence movements. 
Generally, the reasons for holding referendums in the aftermath of the Second World War
were varied. In the case of Mongolia, the vote was held for geopolitical reasons at the
instigation of Stalin. The vote in Algeria was held after a lengthy war of independence
and negotiations; ideologically, Charles de Gaulle was strongly for the referendum – an
instrument pioneered by his political idol Napoleon. But overall it would be difficult to
find a general pattern of when referendums were held after the Second World War. Not
all social science phenomena follow a law-like pattern, or as Karl Marx put it,  “world
history would have been a rather mysterious thing if chance didn’t play a role”.3
In the 1970s there was only one referendum on independence: the decision of the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands to become independent from the USA under the name of
the Federated States of Micronesia in 1975. In the 1980s there was a similar paucity of
plebiscites, the only one being the 1980 vote in the Francophone Canadian province of
Quebec,  in which 59 percent,  on a 85 percent turnout,  rejected the secessionist  Parti
Québécois’s proposal for “sovereignty association” – a veiled description of independence.
It was only after the fall of Communism in 1989 and after the collapse of the Soviet Union
in 1991 that the floodgates of independence referendums opened. Again the reasons seem
to have been varied. But, in many cases, referendums were held because the international
community – especially the major European powers – insisted upon referendums in order
to recognise the new states. Especially the Badinter Commission – set up by the European
Communities (soon to become the EU) – stressed that referendums were a conditio sine qua
non for recognizing new states. There is historical and anecdotal evidence to suggest that
it  was  this  requirement  that  prompted  a  large  number  of  successor-states  to  hold
referendums especially in the Former Yugoslavia.4 
But the referendum was also in many cases a kind of symbolic national manifestation of a
newly  found  freedom.  By  voting  –  often  almost  unanimously  –  in  an  independence
referendum, the new state made the plebiscite a symbolic representation of the nation
itself; a mirror image of the demos and the ethnos merged into one indivisible unity. Ernest
Renan’s often cited remark, that a “nation is a daily plebiscite” is an accurate description of
these referendums. But as this author has argued at length elsewhere, the referendums
were also held for more prosaic reasons, namely when a new elite was under threat from
external and internal powers and wanted to prove that it had popular support and the
requisite legitimacy to govern.5 The celebrations of independence through referendums
had ulterior motives and often displayed that “violent passion for assent, for unanimity” that
Carl  Friedrich  and  Zbigniew Brzezinski  famously  made  the  hallmark of  totalitarian
dictatorship. 
Table 2 Secession Referendums 1991-2011
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Parent Country Seceding Country Year Turnout% Yes Vote%   
USSR Lithuania 1991 91 84   
USSR Estonia 1991 77 83   
USSR Latvia 1991 74 88   
USSR Georgia 1991 98 90   
USSR Ukraine 1991 70 85   
Georgia South Ossetia 1991 98 90   
Georgia Abkhasia 1991 99 58   
Yugoslavia Croatia 1991 98 83   
Croatia Serbs 1991 98 83   
Yugoslavia Macedonia 1991 70 75   
USSR Armenia 1991 95 90   
Bosnia Serbs 1991 90 -   
Serbia Sandjak 1991 96 67   
Serbia Kosovo 1991 99 87   
USSR Turkmenistan 1991 94 97   
USSR Karabagh 1991     
USSR Uzbekistan 1991 98 94   
Macedonia Albanians 1991 99 93   
Moldova Transnistie 1991     
Yugoslavia Bosnia 1992 99 64   
Yugoslavia Montenegro 1992 96 44   
Georgia South Ossetia 1992 NA NA   
Bosnia Krajina 1992 99 64   
Ethiopia Eritrea 1993 99 98   
Bosnia Serbs 1993 96 92   
USA Puerto Rico 1993 48 73   
USA Palau 1993 64 68   
Georgia Abkhasia 1995 96 52   
Quebec Cris 1995 95 75   
Canada Quebec 1995 49 94   
St Kitts and Nevis Nevis 1998 57 61   
USA Porto Rico 1998 50 71   
Indonesia East Timor 1999 78 94   
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Somalia Somaliland 2001 - 97   
New Zealand Tokelau 2006  95   
Yugoslavia Montenegro 2006 55 86   
South Sudan South Sudan 2011 97 98   
Source: www.c2d.ch (accessed October 2, 2013).
Not all of the states, of course, were recognized, and not all of the referendums were
conducted in accordance with the internationally recognized standards of free and fair
voting.
In addition to referendums in former Soviet  and Yugoslav entities,  a proliferation of
plebiscites were held in sub-national territories such as, for example, Abkhazia in Georgia
and Krajina in Bosnia, where minorities sought to win approval for independence from
recently declared independent states. None of these sub-national referendums succeeded.
While most referendums were held in former Communist countries, a few polls were held
in Western democracies. In 1995 the voters in Quebec again rejected independence, this
time by a whisker, and so did voters in Puerto Rico in a multi-option referendum in 1993.
And in 1998,  the voters in Nevis failed to meet the required threshold of 66 percent
necessary to secede from St Kitts and Nevis. Perhaps interestingly, the only unsuccessful
referendums on independence have been held in countries with established democratic
traditions.
Given  that  most  referendums  were  held  in  territories  with  less  than  impeccable
democratic  records,  it  is  difficult  to  establish  what  determines  the  outcome  of  a
referendum. But if we broaden the category to include referendums on autonomy and
devolution  there  seems  to  be  a  tendency  that  voters  are  more  inclined  to  support
propositions,  firstly,  if  they  are  in  favour  of  the  proposition  and,  secondly,  if  the
government proposing the change or the secession has been in power for a relatively
short period of time. In other words, it is easier to win a referendum on devolution or
independence during the honeymoon period immediately after an election, something
proved perhaps by the devolution referendums in Britain in 1997. Conversely the longer
you have been in office the greater the risk of losing the referendum. Why is this? One
possible and credible explanation was advanced by V.O. Key who in a classic analysis
observed that “to govern is to antagonize”.6 All governments break promises, fail to deliver
and enact unpopular laws. A referendum can be a proxy for a vote on the record of the
government. Hence, a No vote in a referendum is often a positive function of the years in
office,  a  fact  perhaps  most  clearly  shown  in  the  Canadian  referendum  on  a  new
Constitution in 1992,  in which Prime Minister Brian Mulroney’s  personal  disapproval
rating was the determining factor. However, it should be noted that Milo Đukanović, the
Prime Minister of Montenegro, had served as premier since 1991 when he succeeded in
winning  the  independence  referendum in  2006.  The  main  factor  behind  winning  an
independence referendum is the voters’ support for the proposition. Given these factors,
it was perhaps not surprising that the Scots rejected independence – though it should be
stressed that the SNP achieved a considerable feat in almost closing the gap. At the risk of
simplifying matters, the nationalist lost the referendum but they won the campaign.
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Balloting to Stop Bullets?
As  was  shown in  the  case  of  Bosnia,  referendums on independence  have  sometimes
resulted in civil war and conflict. Yet, at other times the political split has been amicable.
But  despite  horror-examples  like  the  Former  Yugoslavia,  independence  referendums
relatively rarely result in wars. To wit, in Aleksandar Pavkovic and Peter Radan’s much
cited Creating New States. Theory and Practice of Secession, the authors use six case studies to
uncover the logic of secession;  three violent secessions or secession attempts (Biafra,
Bangladesh  and Chechnya)  and  three  peaceful  ones  (Norway,  Slovakia  and Quebec).7
Interestingly, the former three all have one thing in common: no referendum was held.
Conversely referendums were held in the latter peaceful examples. 
Of  course  this  does  not  prove  that  referendums  are  conducive  to  peaceful  political
divorce  settlements.  If  we  use  the  cases  of  secession  cited  by  Radan  and  Pavkovic
(1900-2010), we find that 44 of the 60 secessions or secession attempts were preceded by
referendums. Of 44 referendums, war broke out in six cases. In other words, the secession
was achieved peacefully in 38 (86 percent) of the cases. Examples such as Bosnia and East
Timor are the exceptions to the rule.
 
Special Majority Requirements
Given the momentous importance of the vote it seems reasonable that “if the approval
rate of a referendum is too low, it ought to be discredited. A nearly simple majority does
not provide sufficient legitimacy”.8 Without passing judgement as to the fairness of such a
requirement, it is worth outlining a few comparative examples of when such stipulations
have  been  introduced.  Turnout  and  quorum requirements  are  relatively  common in
referendums on independence and other referendums on ethnic and national issues.
Of course, this is not just a result of a concern for fairness and democratic legitimacy. Far
from it. In politics opportunism and ulterior motives are often presented in the guises of
what we might call democratic appropriateness. Special majority requirements are no
exception: a special majority quorum is often a mechanism of obstructionism. This was
arguably  the  case  in  the  late  1970s  when  the  Callaghan  government’s  proposal  for
Scottish and Welsh devolution was obstructed by the Labour MP George Cunningham who
introduced an amendment to the effect that devolution had to be supported by a majority
that represented at least 40 percent of the eligible voters. This meant that devolution in
Scotland was rejected although a majority of those voting voted yes in the referendum in
1979.
This type of obstructionism, albeit in a different setting, was also the motivation behind
Soviet  leader  Mikhail  Gorbachev’s  insistence  that  a  two-thirds  majority  should  be
required for secession in Latvia. The Soviet leader was not the only one seeking to use
obstructionist tactics. A similar rule was passed by the Israeli Knesset to the effect that a
peace-deal with the Palestinians must be supported by a supermajority. Tellingly the law
was  introduced  by  parties  opposed  to  returning  the  occupied  territories  to  the
Palestinians. In the light of these examples, it was unsurprising that one of the demands
made by the Khartoum government before the independence referendum in South Sudan
in 2011 was that at least 60 percent turned out to vote.
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The Canadian Clarity Act,  passed in response to a court ruling that a referendum in
Quebec would have to be decisive for the result to stand, is often (but inaccurately) cited a
precedent for supermajority requirements. In fact, the Canadian Act does not provide a
special percentage, but merely states that:
[The House of Commons shall consider] whether, in the circumstances, there has
been a  clear  expression  of  a  will  by  a  clear  majority  of  the  population  of  that
province that the province ceases to be part of Canada. Factors for the House of
Commons to take into account include (2) (a) the size of the majority of valid votes
cast in favor of the secessionist option; (b) the percentage of eligible voters voting
in the referendum; and (c) any other matters or circumstances it considers to be
relevant.9 
A better example of a supermajority requirement, albeit a small one, was used in 2006 in
Montenegro. The law stipulated that independence would be approved if supported by 55
percent of those eligible to vote. The total turnout of the referendum was 86 percent. 55.5
percent voted in favour and 44.5 were against breaking the state union with Serbia. 
Another – perhaps more exotic – example is St Kitts and Nevis in the Caribbean. Under
the constitution, Nevis has considerable autonomy and has an island assembly, a premier,
and a deputy governor general. Under certain specified conditions, it may secede from
the  federation.  In  June  1996,  the  Nevis  Island  Administration  under  the  Concerned
Citizens’ Movement led by of Premier Vance Amory – a former international cricketer
with  a  batting  average  of  23.2  –  announced  its  intention  to  become  independent.
Secession requires approval by two-thirds of the assembly's five elected members and by
two-thirds of voters in a referendum in accordance with Art 38.1 (b) of the Constitution.
After the Nevis Reformation Party blocked the Bill of secession, Amory called for elections
for February 24, 1997. Although the elections produced no change in the composition of
the  assembly,  the  Premier  pledged  to  continue  his  efforts  towards  independence.  A
referendum – which could be regarded as ultra vires  – was held in 1998,  but only 61
percent voted in favour of the proposition, and hence the referendum failed. 
A similar mechanism exists in tiny Tokelau, where a self-determination referendum also
failed to reach the required quorum. Yet, these examples are – given the small size of the
countries – not likely to create precedence in the sense of an international norm with the
force of international law.
In most other referendums (e.g. East Timor in 1999, Malta in 1964, and the referendums
on  independence  for  former  Soviet  States  in  1991),  there  were  no  special  majority
requirements.  While  it  is  certainly  possible  to  cite  examples  of  special  majority
requirements, it cannot in fairness be said that the simple majority requirement in the
forthcoming Scottish referendum is at odds with international norms. 
 
Do Biased Questions in Referendums Affect the
Outcome?
There has been a considerable debate about the wording of the question on the ballot in
referendums on independence. The Scottish government’s decision in 2012 to include the
word “agree” in the proposed question on the ballot  in the 2014 referendum led to
criticism that it was trying to influence the result by using positive language that could
sway voters. The argument – credibly enough – was that a biased and one-sided question
could prompt the voters to vote yes to a question which they, had they understood it,
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would have rejected.  This  has always been a charge against  referendums on divisive
issues. But is it a real danger in referendums on independence? Will the voters be swayed
by rhetorical  questions? Or is the question on the ballot of minor importance as the
voters know the question from the debate?
It is difficult to answer this question with any degree of mathematical certainty but we
can perhaps  draw some conclusions  if  we  compare  some of  the  recent  examples  of
wordings in the referendums on independence held in peacetime in the past 20 years. 
Referendum questions have come in many shapes and sizes, from the blatantly biased to
the bland. In Northern Ireland, in 1998, the voters were asked to approve (or otherwise)
the rather neutral question: “Do you support the agreement reached in multi-party talks on
Northern Ireland and set out in Command Paper 3883?” (the Command Paper 3883 was a coded
reference to the official document containing the Belfast Agreement on power-sharing).
71.2 percent did. 
There  are  several  examples  of  similar  questions  which have  not  created  a  bias.  For
example in 1999, in East Timor, the voters were asked the question: “Do you accept the
proposed special autonomy for East Timor within the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia?” (
emphasis added). A majority of the voters – close to 75 per cent – rejected the proposal with
the  result  that  East  Timor  became  independent.  In  this  internationally  monitored
referendum, that value laden word “accept” did not swing the voters.
A similar conclusion could be drawn from the referendum in Quebec in 1995. In this
referendum the voters were asked a question that included the word “agree”, namely, “Do
you agree that Quebec should become sovereign after having made a formal offer to Canada for a
new economic and political partnership within the scope of the bill respecting the future of Quebec 
and of the agreement signed on June 12, 1995?” (emphasis added).
While the result was very close (the proposal was defeated by 51 percent), there was no
indication that the wording of the question swayed the voters. The citizens had learned
about the pros and cons of the proposed “sovereignty association” during the campaign.
In both East Timor and Quebec,  it  seems that an attempt to hoodwink the voters to
support a proposition by using positive language failed. 
So what questions have been asked? There is no standard format, but a quick look at
recent examples may be illustrative. In 2006 the voters in Montenegro voted 55.5-44.5 for
independence by supporting the proposition: “Do you want the Republic of Montenegro to be
an independent state with a full international and legal personality?”. The question was drafted
with  the  help  of  the  EU.  As  in  Montenegro,  the  question  on  the  ballot  on  Eritrean
independence from Ethiopia in 1993 was drafted by an international committee. Having
been advised by the United Nations, the parties opted for the simple question: “Do you
want Eritrea to be independent?”.
Another example of a simple question was provided by the UN-organised referendum in
South Sudan in 2011. In this referendum the voters – many of whom were illiterate – were
presented with  two images  and the  text  in  both Arabic  and English  saying either  “
separation” or “unity”. 
During the negotiations between the Sudanese government in Khartoum and the pro-
independence SPLM/A movement in South Sudan, the latter expressed reservations about
the positive connotations of the word “unity” and the negative connotations of the word
“separation”.  However,  on polling day,  these positive words did not sway the voters.
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Independence was supported by 99 percent in a reasonably fair referendum monitored by
the United Nations.
These examples do not conclusively prove that referendum questions have no effect on
the outcome, but it is noteworthy that the attempts to use positive language in both
Quebec and East Timor – and to a lesser degree in South Sudan – failed to sway the voters
in massive numbers. Needless to say, the results do not tell us anything about the motives
of  the  individual  voters.  But  we  have  no  evidence  from  qualitative  or  quantitative
research that suggests that the question mattered, if anything the result in East Timor
and the Sudan show that those who attempted to use value laden words went down to
conclusive defeats.
 
Who should be allowed to vote?
Who is a member of the demos? Who is a voter? Are you still a part of the demos if you
leave the country, or are you then merely a part of the ethnos? 
It is questionable whether those living outside a jurisdiction have thereby forfeited their
right to vote. Some litigation in Europe suggests as much. For example, in an obiter dictum
in Matthews v. United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights found that : “persons
who  are  unable  to  take  part  in  elections  because  they  live  outside  the  jurisdiction [...]  have
weakened the link between themselves and the jurisdiction, and can consequently not claim a right
to vote”.10 This ruling was recently reinforced by Schindler v United Kingdom. However, in
the latter case, the European Court of Human Rights held that “the matter may need to be
kept under review in so far as attitudes in European democratic society evolve”. It continued that
“the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the State in this area still remains a wide one” and as a
consequence citizens of countries that are signatories to the European Convention of
Human Rights do not have a right to vote in national elections and referendums. But the
law may change as “there is a clear trend in favour of allowing voting by non-residents, with
forty-four States granting the right to vote to citizens resident abroad otherwise than on State
service”.11 However, it is still permissible to deny non-residents the right to vote. This
might justify the exclusion of  Montenegrins living in Serbia in the 2006 referendum.
Conversely, there are examples of voters in the diaspora being entitled to vote. In both
East Timor in 1999 and in Eritrea in 1993, the voters living outside the country were
allowed to vote. However, in the two cases this inclusion of expats was arguably justified
on account of the displacement that took place due to violent conflicts. Given the recent
litigation  and  the  precedent  from  the  recent  referendum  in  Montenegro,  it  seems
consistent with international norms that Scots living in England, Wales, Northern Ireland,
or other parts of the world are not entitled to vote in the 2014 referendum.
 
Conclusion
Referendums  have  come  in  waves.  Beginning  in  the  1860s  when  several  of  the
Confederate states seceded from the Union in the United States (and hence precipitated
the Civil  War),  secessionist  referendums were held in Norway (1905),  the Philippines
(1935) and unsuccessfully in Western Australia (1933). 
Generally referendums on independence only became common after the fall of the Soviet
Union,  possibly  because  a  number  of  Western  states  insisted  on  the  ratification  of
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declarations of independence in referendums. But referendums were also held as a kind
of national celebration of the newly established unity. 
Most  referendums  have been  held  in  countries  with  relatively  weak  democratic
institutions. The often huge yes majorities suggest that the votes are not always free and
fair.  But  in  the  few  independence  referendums  that  have  been  held  in  democratic
countries,  it  seems that governments have tended to win the plebiscites if  they have
taken office recently and only if there is broad popular support for independence before
the  campaign.  Given  the  SNP  has  been  in  office  since  2007  and  that  support  for
independence before the campaign stood at 33 percent, this was not a good omen for
those  supporting  Scottish  independence,  although  the  margin  of  victory  for  the
opponents was much narrower than many had expected prior to the vote.
Referendums have on occasion resulted in the exacerbation of ethnic conflict, such as in
Bosnia-Herzegovina and in East Timor. However, generally speaking referendums are not
correlated with civil war. War resulted in only 13 percent of the cases. 
Most of the debate about the referendums has revolved around procedural questions,
such  as  whether  there  should  be  a  special  majority  requirement,  or  who should  be
allowed to vote. Independence is an irreversible event; for this reason, it could be argued,
there should be a special  majority requirement in such a plebiscite.  While there are
examples  of  special  majority  requirements  in  countries  with  impeccable  democratic
records – such as Canada – these are rare. More often than not such requirements have
been introduced as an obstructionist tactic, such as in Israel or the Soviet Union. Given
that  most  referendums  on  independence  have  not  been  subject  to  a  supermajority
requirement,  to demand a special  majority in the Scottish referendum would not  be
warranted. As a general rule, only voters living in the jurisdiction are allowed to vote. To
be  sure  expats  and  displaced  voters  were  allowed  to  vote  in  the  independence
referendums in Eritrea and South Sudan. But in Montenegro in 2005 only those living in
the country, no matter what ethnicity they were, were entitled to vote. A recent case-law
from the European Court of Human Rights suggested that the Scottish government is
justified in only allowing voters living in Scotland to vote. However the issue of voting
rights  for  non-resident  citizens  is,  as  the European Court  of  Human Rights noted in
Schindler v United Kingdom, to be “kept under review” as “there is a clear trend in favour of
allowing  voting  by  non-residents”.  Referendums  on  independence  seem  likely  to  keep
constitutional and international lawyers as well as their political scientist colleagues busy
for years to come.
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ABSTRACTS
To date  there  have  been  fifty  independence  referendums.  Some  have  been  official,  others
unofficial. Some have been successful, and others have ended in failure. This article analyses how
independence referendums have contributed to more civic engagement and how this use of the
referendum can - under certain circumstances - enhance the ideals of participation espoused by
the likes of Rousseau, Tocqueville and Mill.
A ce jour, cinquante référendums sur l’indépendance ont été organisés dans le monde. Certains
furent officiels, d’autres officieux. Certains ont réussi, d’autres ont échoué. Cet article analyse la
façon  dont  les  référendums  sur  l’indépendance  ont  contribué  à  accroître  l’implication  des
citoyens  dans  la  vie  publique  et  ont  pu,  dans  certaines  circonstances,  conforter  les  idéaux
participatifs promus par Rousseau, Tocqueville et Mill.
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